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1 
The Muslim Continuum: An Analytical Model of Religiosity and Socio-
Political Diversity in Muslim Minority Environments 
Abstract 
This paper examines the challenges facing Muslim societies in the early part of the twenty-
first century. The paper examines tensions between ‘liberal’ interpretations of Islam and 
extreme views within a globalisation paradigm and how these are changing. Specifically, the 
work investigates how the spotlight on Islam and its adherents in a post 9/11 world has 
manifest among Muslim individuals, groups and societies and how these may change to 
accommodate or react to the shifting global frame of mind towards Islam and the Muslims. 
Analysis is provided within the context of Muslim minority dwellers, with focus on Muslims 
living in Britain. The paper further proposes a fundamentalism continuum based on 
Dekmejian’s1 model and analyses its impact on the Muslim Diaspora. 
Introduction 
The resurgence of religion in the latter quarter of the twentieth century was largely 
unexpected, since the global trend was clearly towards contemporary secularism. Hefner
2
 
notes, “A key feature of world politics in recent years has been the resurgence of religious 
issues and organisations into public affairs. Whether with the Christian Coalition in the U.S., 
Hindu nationalism in India, militant Buddhism in Sri Lanka, or Islamist movements in the 
Muslim world, the end of the twentieth century demonstrated convincingly that high 
modernist reports of religion's demise were, to say the least, premature.” 
 
Focussing on Islam, it is clear in a post 9/11 world that the Muslim world (perhaps together 
with China and, to a lesser extent, Russia) carries substantive political focus in the West. 
Domestic and international concerns about Muslim societies, Islamic radicalism and the 
threat of extremist violence are at the head of home and foreign affairs issues in many 
countries in the West. Among Muslims living in the West, consequential policies, political 
governance and media scrutiny has given rise to a dynamic tension on an individual, as well 
as collective basis. For example, the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ carries significant 
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meaning in contemporary society with a strongly negative and political connotation in 
mainstream media and society. 
 
The paper explores the term fundamentalism, its general religious and specifically Islamic 
contexts, before exploring the political implications of Islamic fundamentalism in which the 
term is being used. The work further investigates twenty-first century Islamic 
fundamentalism and examines the liberalist/extremist dichotomy through a continuum model 
of Muslim thought and expression through which Islamic political and socio-cultural 
environments can be understood. An examination of whether or not non-fundamentalist 
Muslims exist is given as well as a recent chronology of Islamic fundamentalism. Finally, the 
paper draws lessons from the model and, using British Muslims as a case example of a 
Muslim minority environment, the interconnectedness of reformation and Islamic 
fundamentalism is examined. 
Islamic fundamentalism 
Fundamentalism, in general, is often articulated as a meeting of faith and politics with an 
emphasis on literal interpretation and strict adherence to some religious scripture in a present-
day setting. Historically, the term fundamentalism was first used to describe a backlash 
amongst Protestant sects to growing modernity within Christianity consequential to the 
acceptance of Darwinist theory, in the early decades of the twentieth century.
3
 It has therefore 
been defined as “contemporary religio-political movements that attempt to return to the 
scriptural foundations of the community, excavating and reinterpreting these foundations for 
application to the contemporary social and political world”.4 
 
However, this generic notion of fundamentalism has taken on a far more distinct 
understanding in a post 9-11 context, as it singles out Islam in its characterisation. Thus, 
Soanes and Stevenson
5
 define fundamentalism as the “strict maintenance of the doctrines of 
any religion, notably Islam, according to a strict, literal interpretation of scripture.” Thus, 
fundamentalism as a global phenomenon is now almost exclusively reserved for use in 
relation to Islam, as seen in these definitions, though the relationship with all Abrahamic 
faiths remains,
6
 albeit at more localised levels. Examples of this would be the use of the term 
in relation to al-Qaeda and its global operations and networks, as opposed to Irish 
republicanism, which is geo-centric to the nations of Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
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Furthermore, “Islamic fundamentalism appeared in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as 
a reaction to the disintegration of Islamic political and economic power, asserting that Islam 
is central to both state and society and advocating strict adherence to the Koran (Qur’an) and 
to Islamic law (Shari’ah), supported if need be by Jihad”.7 Fundamentalism thus carries 
inward and outward characteristics. Inwardly, it is an individual’s stringent observance of 
orthodox tenets of a particular faith. Outwardly, it is a public opposition to liberalism and 
materialism.
8
 Thus, the term Islamic fundamentalism is very much in use today to describe 
Muslim revivalism and neo-traditionalism,
9
 with the media utilising the term with a negative 
connotation in order to “devilise”10 its adherents. 
 
Although many use the term Islamic fundamentalism interchangeably with Islamism, they are 
distinct, as Islamism denotes Islamic fundamentalism with a political agenda.
11
 Thus, an 
Islamist is an Islamic fundamentalist, but not necessarily vice versa. However, others, such as 
Butko
12
 use the term Islamic fundamentalism deliberately to mean political Islam, 
particularly in the context of movements expressing views opposing authoritarian one-party 
states, in particular in the Middle East. Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab world is thus 
narrated as the tool which counteracts cultural, social and intellectual stagnation.
13
 Euben
14
 
interprets her definition, given earlier, as being composed of two essential elements; firstly, 
an emphasis on politics and fundamentalism being intertwined, thereby excluding mystic 
forms of Islamic devotion such as Sufism; and secondly being part of a scriptural tradition, 
meaning, in the case of Islam, the Qur’an. 
 
It is also true that the use of the term Islamic fundamentalism within popular news media can 
evoke notions of militancy, extremism, violence and even terrorism.  Thus, the impression 
left in the minds of many is that all Muslims are an intolerant, backward and ignorant people.  
Images such as book burning British Muslims on the streets of Bradford in 1989 at the height 
of the Rushdie affair
15
 or celebratory Palestinians distributing festive sweets in the immediate 
aftermath of 9-11
16
 and a plethora of other similar images engraved in the minds of television 
viewers the world over, only serve to reinforce this notion. 
 
Though this merely alludes to perceptions amongst those who have little knowledge of the 
diversity of views amongst Muslims as well as the rich historical contribution Islam and 
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Muslims have made to broader civilisation, amongst Muslims themselves, there exists an 
historical “tension between Islamic fundamentalists and liberal Muslim intellectuals”.17 
Furthermore, Albertini
18
 argues that both Islamists and fundamentalist Muslims are “anti-
intellectuals” by Islam’s own standards of religious scholarship through a rejection of both 
Ijtihād and freethinking, both of which are traditional scholarly values among classical 
Islamic thinkers and gives credence to this view by citing Islam’s current scholarly vacuum. 
A recent chronology of Islamic fundamentalism 
The resurgence of Islam was manifested in two political forms, nationalist and fundamentalist 
and, much to the surprise of Orientalist scholars of recent decades such as Riesebrod,
19
 led to 
piety amongst the poor, as opposed to revolution, and acceptance of the patriarchal society in 
women. These shifting sands of political thought which included the middle-elite in the 
Muslim world, was summed up by Gaffney,
20
 who says, “In the 1970s, the Islamicist agenda 
began to find a newly receptive public, especially among that same educated class that had 
imbibed the imported tonics of liberating socialism or liberal capitalism, only to find them 
toxic.” The message was clear. They had experienced or understood all potential models for 
existence, but chosen Islam as their ‘way of life.’ But for what reasons? 
 
Over the past twenty-five years, Muslims in particular, have been defined by a considerable 
shift in terms of the impact and relevance of Islamism on and within nations across the world.  
From the standpoint of the Arab world, the first period, from circa 1989 to 2001, witnessed 
governments across this region being forced to take defensive positions against Islamist 
expansion.  The Islamist regime in Sudan, which took hold of power through a military coup 
d’état in 1989, the near grasp of power by FIS, who won democratic elections in Algeria in 
1991, followed by Tunisia denying Islamist participation in elections through fear of Islamist 
gains similar to their neighbours, Islamist parliamentary gains were also observed in liberal 
Arab states such as Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt, Hezbollah gains in Lebanon in 1992, Salafist 
pressure being brought to bear on the House of Saud, PLO on the defensive against Hamas in 
the Palestinian territories are all examples of this phenomenon.  The only exceptions in the 
Arab world were the Ba’thists in Syria and Iraq, with Islamist resurgence appearing in those 
nations beyond this period.
21
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In the West, this period was signified by a simplicity of understanding about the Muslim 
world, seen as a region of tragedy, civil war, killing, bombing and extremism; which was 
summed up as ‘Islamic fundamentalism’.22 Huntington’s prophecy, that not all societies, and 
especially Muslim societies, were likely to develop democracies, as democratic values 
conflict with core values, or fundamentals, of the culture to which they are being aligned, was 
coming true.
23
 
 
The second period, from 2001 until the present day, has been defined and shaped by the 
events of September 11, 2001 and the actions that followed.  The wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have refashioned the political landscape of the Middle East with respect to 
Islamism, which have impacted on the psyche of Muslims across the world, with an emphasis 
on liberalisation of the masses and extremism becoming progressively more marginalised. 
Thus the terrorist atrocities of 2001 have acted in some way as a catalyst for making 
distinctions amongst Muslims, as The Prince of Wales stated in 1994, saying, “we need to be 
careful of that emotive label, "fundamentalism", and distinguish, as Muslims do, between 
revivalists, who choose to take the practice of their religion most devoutly, and fanatics or 
extremists, who use this devotion for political ends”.24 It is apparent, therefore, that even 
thinkers in the Western world were beginning to develop an understanding of the 
fundamentalism continuum, even before 2001. 
Indicators on fundamentalism 
Appleby and Marty
25
 examined the misconceptions that surround the term fundamentalism in 
its general sense. Their findings are explicit and argue that all fundamentalisms are religious, 
rejecting the presence of scientific or secular fundamentalism since these do not have an 
ultimate concern which affects their actions in the way religious fundamentalists, spurred on 
by the promise of an eternal reward, are. Contrary to this view, in considering actions of 
groups and individuals driven by specific issues, such as animal rights or environmental 
activists, it can be seen that their responses are based on a form of fundamentalism, the 
fundamental rights of creatures or the planet in these cases. Their actions, like religious 
fundamentalism, are manifest across a range of activities and behaviour, for example, 
intellectual, protest, disruption, anarchy and violence. 
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They further argue that fundamentalism is not restricted to monotheist traditions, but 
manifests elsewhere, in Hindu and Sikh religions, for example.
26
 In terms of fanatic 
fundamentalist religious groups and sects turning to terrorism, unlike Islamic and Christian 
extremists, others do operate, but for the most part in the confines of associated geographical 
limitations; Hindu and Sikh extremists in India and Aum Shinrikyo in Japan are good 
examples. It is further observed that fundamentalists are not literalists, rather the 
interpretation of scripture, law and tradition emphasises a reliance on hermeneutics. In 
Islamic fundamentalism, it is precisely the interpretation of scripture that extreme forms of 
fundamentalist use to justify their methods and goals. Moreover, fundamentalism does not 
attract only the uneducated poor, but also the educated, skilled and gainfully employed. 
 
This is the case from both the narrow perspective of the media-driven view of 
fundamentalism as tantamount to violent extremism, where many active members have been 
shown to be well-educated and affluent affiliates, and the broader view that fundamentalists 
include devotional people with a strong scriptural belief. This is also true across religions. It 
is also appreciated that fundamentalism does not lead to a violent outcome or disposition, but 
rather socio-cultural factors are strongly deterministic. In the immediate aftermath of 9-11, 
the idea that ‘Muslim equals terrorist’ surfaced albeit briefly in the US. Mamdani writes that 
the absence of distinction between terrorist and civilian, in favour of a distinction on the 
grounds that a Muslim was either a “good Muslim” or a “bad Muslim” (and all good Muslims 
are non-fundamentalists, all bad Muslims are fundamentalists) in US popular discourse at the 
time, is extremely grave and potentially enduring.
27
 In the intervening years, this has 
languished into a loss of trust between Muslim and Western communities, as the unspoken 
feeling is that many people continue to believe or feel the phenomenon, though it is no longer 
articulated publicly. This point further develops Appleby and Marty’s view, that all 
fundamentalists are not the same, rather that they exist across a range of people of social, 
cultural and economic backgrounds with differing political persuasions, which requires 
greater depth of investigation to understand than merely that purported by the mass media. 
 
Appleby and Marty further proffer that fundamentalists do not oppose change but rather seek 
change, albeit to counter godlessness in society. Socio-cultural norms that surround 
communities are thus influential on the identity of individuals and social groups within them, 
which in turn drives change.
28
 Finally, personality cults do not drive fundamentalism. 
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Personalities may be instrumental in setting or affecting agendas, or be motivational in their 
own right, but their raison d’être is to argue a case, perhaps violently, to traditional values. 
Thus, fundamentalist icons and cult leaders are not the same. 
 
These outcomes are supported, in part, by Euben, who states that fundamentalists all too 
often dismissed as irrational dogmatists, with reinforcement through mass media, must 
actually be regarded as rationalists, who carry a “compelling yet dangerous ethico-political 
vision”.29 In understanding the misconceptions, however, it becomes clear that, rather than 
assuming a monochromatic view of fundamentalism in Islam, it is necessary to examine and 
analyse a range, or indeed continuum of views which collectively define fundamentalists. 
The Islamic fundamentalism continuum 
 
[Figure 1 HERE] 
 
Figure 1, which Dekmejian discussed within the context of Islamism within twentieth century 
Egyptian society,
30
 can be used as a model by which the examination of the context of 
Muslim consciousness in a post 9-11 world can be articulated more broadly. The model is 
adapted here as a continuum, as adjacent aspects are to some extent not discernible and also 
interrelate, whereas extremities are very distinct. Further, and more insightful, is the prospect 
that individuals can move along the continuum in either direction as a consequence of 
internal and external political, intellectual, economic and social forces. 
 
To define the continuum modelled, Secular Muslims (or ‘Ordinary Muslims’ as Dekmejian 
described them), practice Islam to varying degrees of regularity; Populist Muslims are those 
who believe in revivalism and are regular in their observance of the acts which demonstrate 
their faith in a conspicuous manner (prayer, fasting, Hajj etc) though are not activists or 
affiliated to any coordinating organisation; Social/Spiritual Revivalists introduce organised 
forms onto the continuum, movements which organise study groups, collective acts of 
spiritual development and simplistic forms of outreach and propagation of their faith and 
beliefs, mainly towards Secular Muslims further to the left, and they are commonly devoid of 
political discourse; Political Gradualists represent a section of the population who are often 
Social/Spiritual Revivalists with an added political dimension, though non-confrontational 
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and unchallenging of the national administration, who express themselves through organised 
conferences, with identifiable scholars, and often hark back to early Islamic history to 
illustrate deficiencies in contemporary thinking; Political Activists are Political Gradualists, 
who are confrontational with the administration in power, mostly through challenging current 
policy, political public demonstration and published works which challenge the status quo; 
finally, Revolutionary Jihadists are those who take up arms against the ruling elite, calling for 
uprising and insurgency with the view to bring about change through insurrection and follow 
belief structures founded on a return to an Islamic caliphate through hostility and conflict. 
 
Table 1 highlights broad distinguishing features across the fundamentalism continuum, with 
examples. One additional entry is that of Internet utilisation. An interesting note of 
commonality across the continuum is that, for a variety of reasons, the use of information 
technology, in particular the Internet is well utilised amongst Muslims globally. With limited 
exceptions, the Internet is viewed pragmatically, where, in contrast to say television, which is 
regarded as demonic by some on the continuum, the value of the Internet as a means of 
‘getting the message across’ seemingly trumps any criticism it may receive across the entire 
continuum. Such technology is regarded as beneficial in terms of global coordination within a 
group and global communication to those outside of groups.
31
 
 
[Table 1 HERE] 
 
A point of interest across the continuum is that the commonly held belief in the West, that of 
Islamic ‘exceptionalism’, which is that fundamentalists reject the three defining political 
characteristics of modernity, namely democracy, secularism and nationalism,
32
 does not hold 
across the continuum. This again reinforces the distinction between political Islamism, where 
this rejection exists and apolitical fundamentalists, who subscribe to one or more of these 
characteristics. 
 
Of course, the issue of fundamentalist versus non-fundamentalist is a source of debate and 
cannot be represented, by definition, on a fundamentalism continuum. Further, scholars 
appear to vary in opinion as to whether all Muslims belong somewhere on the continuum, or 
that the continuum is limited, and other Muslims exist, who are not fundamentalist. Certainly, 
in terms of extremism, nothing further could possibly exist to the right of Revolutionary 
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Jihadists, though it may be argued that Revolutionary Jihadists can be sub-categorised by the 
extremities of violence they are liable to undertake. The debate is therefore whether or not 
liberality amongst Muslims can exist to the left of Secular Muslims on the continuum and, if 
indeed, ‘Secular’ and ‘Fundamentalist’ are indeed comparable. 
 
In answering this issue, Monroe and Kreidie’s empirical evaluation of fundamentalist and 
non-fundamentalist thought and practice is helpful.
33
 Through the examination of certain 
characteristics tested through interview, they delineated between fundamentalist and non-
fundamentalist Muslims. The characteristics explored level of religiosity; comprehensiveness 
of religious worldview; reason and revelation; conversion; identity versus choice; and 
cost/benefit calculus. For example, in terms of their level of religiosity, fundamentalists were 
seen to organise their lives around the teachings of the Qur’an, prophetic traditions and 
Shari’ah, indicating Populist Islamist classification as the furthest left on the continuum. In 
contrast, non-fundamentalists by their measure, identified with being Muslim and the first 
pillar of Islam (testimony of faith) in terms of their religious identity, but fell short of any 
form of ritualistic practice, such as prayer or fasting. Other interviewees, however, saw 
religion as an insurance policy for the afterlife or preferred not to be labelled ‘Muslim’ at all, 
emphasising self-improvement, thus not practicing Islam to any degree outside perceived 
moral or ethical norms of civilised society. This latter group, according to Monroe and 
Kreidie’s evaluation, and supported by others, constitutes non-fundamentalist Muslims as 
they appear nowhere on the fundamentalist continuum, being further to the left of Secular 
Muslims. The issue is one of perspective. Fundamentalists themselves argue that Islam, 
unlike Judaism, is not a racial identity and so non-fundamentalists could be considered to 
have apostate or left the ‘fold of Islam’, which, ironically, supports the argument that all 
Muslims fall on the continuum as, according to them, all others were ‘apostates’. However, if 
the individual considers him/herself a Muslim, this could either merely expand the definition 
of what constitutes Secular Muslim, or allows for the possibility of the existence of non-
fundamentalist Muslims being to the left of the continuum. 
 
What the fundamentalism continuum further illustrates is that Muslims not only exist on this 
continuum, but that their understanding, interpretation and implementation of Islamic 
teaching and values can result in movement along the continuum. However, in order for this 
to occur, there must be forces, or drivers, in existence which either explicitly or implicitly 
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encourages such movement to occur. This may be through the effects of mass media, through 
campaigns and advocacy projects, through policy, globalisation, or through agenda 
propagated by state apparatus or as a result of other factors. 
 
It can also be hypothesised that underlying social conditions may affect movement on the 
continuum. For example, disproportionate poverty and unemployment may encourage 
movement to the right of the continuum as migrant communities of Muslims feel 
disenfranchised by the state, which develops a strong sense of inequitable treatment leading 
to more extreme views. This formed part of the discourse on inward migration into France 
from North Africa, following the Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris in 2015. Similarly, British 
Muslims responsible for the London bombings of 2005 were from earlier migrant 
communities settled in socially deprived areas in the north of England and are often cited in 
support this view. The reverse archetype may also be true among Muslim minorities in the 
Western hemisphere, that belonging to the middle class, with good educational and career 
opportunities, results in the liberalisation of values towards secular and capitalist thought and 
consequent movement to the left of the continuum. 
 
Within this discourse is the role of the media, which includes print media, television and 
evermore prominently, the worldwide web. The Internet specifically, is utilised across the 
fundamentalism continuum with extremist groups vying to radicalise young men in 
particular, with more moderate organisations and individuals concentrating on education, 
pluralism and morality found in Islamic teaching being pronounced. 
The fundamentalism continuum and British Muslims 
Though the understanding of Muslims within and amongst British Muslim society has been 
well researched, the broader context requires further analysis in order to appreciate the 
fundamentalism continuum from a more far-reaching viewpoint. In this regard, two key 
issues stand out in the new millennium, those of ‘Islamophobia’ and the ‘Prevent’ 
programme. 
 
Islamophobia is “an outlook or world-view involving an unfounded dread and dislike of 
Muslims, which results in practices of exclusion and discrimination.” From this perspective, 
Islam is viewed as unresponsive to change, with adherents to the faith, in Britain in particular, 
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but elsewhere in the western hemisphere also, being perceived as lacking the will to integrate 
and existing separately in ghettos. Consequently, Islam is seen as having alien values from 
the standpoint of the dominant culture of the West and little in common with other cultures 
and there is a sense of Muslims as being inferior, irrational, primitive and oppressive to 
women. However, people opposed to Islam have historically held these views and there is 
nothing new in these expressions. What is new is the growing perception among some, that 
followers of Islam are all terrorists or are strongly supportive of terrorism.  These views are 
then used to justify discriminatory practices towards Muslims and exclusion of Muslims from 
mainstream society, with such antagonism seen as accepted and normal.
34
 
 
Within this environment and in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and 7/7 London bombings, the 
British government began an anti-terrorism programme called ‘Prevent’, with the objective of 
stopping people, particularly young British Muslim men, being radicalised and becoming 
terrorists or violent extremists. On the surface, it can be analysed that, with consideration of 
the fundamentalism continuum, the objective was to prevent Muslims from moving to the 
right of the continuum and, perhaps, encourage those on the centre-right, to move further to 
the left. Contrary to this aspiration, the programme became beset with criticism, as it singled 
out one religious minority in a discriminatory fashion. The active encouragement of 
intelligence gathering has consequently become tantamount to discrimination and spying with 
prejudice on Muslim citizens. Funding of schemes through the Prevent programme were 
criticised and growing numbers of Muslim organisations expressed disdain and declined to 
become recipients of funding. Though 53 Million GBP was spent between 2007 and 2010 on 
over one thousand Prevent projects, the programme not only alienated many among those it 
was designed to engage with, but may have been counterproductive, by encouraging 
disaffected Muslims to move further to the right on the continuum. 
 
A key factor influencing British Muslims and their relationship to the continuum is identity. 
Peek
35
 outlines four reasons why religion has become an important basis for identity, within 
the context of American Muslims, which are equally pertinent to the discourse on British 
Muslims. Firstly, religious identity gains prominence as a reaction to alienation, particularly 
in circumstances where the Muslim individual has moved from a Muslim majority country, 
being part of the dominant religion of a nation, to being a representative of a minority 
religion. An example is a Pakistani Muslim immigrant to Britain; with Muslims forming 96.4 
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percent of the population of Pakistan but only 4.6 percent of Britain’s population.36 Secondly, 
for tangible, material benefits, where a stronger religious identity can facilitate community 
networking and economic opportunities. Thirdly, shared worship acts as a vehicle for unity 
amongst diverse groups. Finally, religious identity is seen as a means for the preservation of 
group cohesion. 
 
The identity of Muslims living in Britain is being challenged and analysed rigorously, in 
large part due to public discourse concerning the threat Muslims may pose in the wake of 
global terrorist attacks and Middle East politics. As a backdrop to this, Muslims were already 
undergoing significant change over recent decades as they struggled to find an identity and a 
voice as a minority religion amongst minority ethnic communities living in the West, with 
beliefs and practices that often put them at odds with the receiving culture. This has given 
rise to the ‘deprivationist’ perspective as Lewis37 describes it, whereby Muslim communities 
of Asian origin feel discriminated against to the point of racial exclusion, eventually leading 
to alienation and, occasionally, revolt, such as with the Burnley, Oldham and Bradford riots 
of summer 2001. 
 
Others have argued that the deprivationist viewpoint does not hold true, but rather that race, 
religion and culture are mere excuses used by migrant communities to disguise a failure by 
themselves to integrate and assimilate with the dominant culture and societal norms. Often 
cited as proof of this are figures pertaining to educational standards. For example, in the late 
eighties, youths of Bangladeshi origin were one sixth as likely to have taken and passed an A-
level qualification when compared to the national average. Such figures give rise to the view 
that it is a fundamental failure of immigrant communities to recognise that their settlement in 
Britain is permanent and their integration is vital. 
 
Though Muslims themselves often speak of a desire for unity across their communities with a 
view to following a cohesive way forward for establishing an identity which ‘fits’ their 
existence in Britain, the reality is that British Muslims have three distinctive choices along 
three distinctive paths. Geaves
38
 expounds the three choices; isolation, assimilation and 
integration, in his thesis which is based upon “three choices being presented to them (young 
Muslims) by the receiving culture.” In addition to these three choices, earlier research 
addressed their interplay with a level of loyalty to three available paths; ethnic culture, British 
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culture and religious identity, where ethnic culture addresses internal conflict issues (within 
families and communities), British culture addresses external conflict issues (with the 
dominant culture) and religious identity, which addresses religious conflict issues (alignment 
with religious values), hence the three paths.
39
 
 
The interplay between these three choices and three paths are visible not only at national and 
community levels, but are highly discernible within individual family units, with different 
siblings being noticeable as archetypes for the available choices and paths and hence singular 
households representing different positions on the continuum. For example, a Muslim who 
dates or drinks alcohol, will be considered as integrated into British culture, and welcomed by 
the receiving culture, will most likely be isolated from his ethnic cultural group. Similarly, a 
British Muslim who dresses in Arab / South Asian clothing may well be isolated from the 
receiving culture but be either assimilated or integrated into both ethnic culture and religious 
identity. In such a way, these intersections can allow any Muslim to categorise themselves in 
relation to the three choices. The reality is, of course, far from black and white as the example 
suggests. However, these boundaries can be considered as archetypal in an effort to 
understand the dialectic of the discourse and subsequently serve to nuance the understanding 
of the fundamentalism continuum. 
 
Therefore, in terms of British Muslims, this paper concludes that Geaves’ view that “Islam is 
becoming the dominant mark of identity for the Muslim population (in Britain) ... influenced 
by the worldwide resurgence of Islam”40 is supported to a great extent. However, it can also 
be said that Bilgrami’s hypothesis also holds true, that “... there is no reason to doubt that 
Muslims, even devout Muslims, will and do take their commitment to Islam not only as one 
among other values, but also as something which is itself differentiated internally into a 
number of, in principle, negotiable detailed commitments.”41 This view is further supported 
by Akbarzadeh and Roose’s “silent majority”,42 designated as cultural Muslims, being those 
Muslims for whom “religion is not the primary source of identity” and hence fall squarely on 
the left of the continuum, also termed “Secular Muslims” by Akbarzadeh and Roose’s 
categorisation. Thus, the evolution of a British-Islamic identity continues, albeit with its 
devotees approaching the challenges and choices in a non-uniform, fragmented fashion, with 
little sense of a cohesive approach for which many are proponents. This lack of cohesiveness 
is supported throughout the cited literature. As Ansari states, “...British Muslims at the start 
 
 
 
14 
of the twenty-first century are neither ethnically nor ideologically homogenous,”43 in other 
words, occupying scattered positions across the fundamentalism continuum. 
Islamic reformation and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism 
If we now understand that Islamic fundamentalism is much broader than its paradigm as 
portrayed through mass media, encompassing all or nearly all Muslims on a continuum of 
thought, practice and activism; consequently, that it is inclusive and not all unconstructive; 
we need to understand how it fits with the wider picture of Islamic reformation in recent 
decades. Is it a repetitive cycle where fundamentalism and reformation are intertwined, with 
one driving the other, and, as a by-product, resulting in continuous growth? 
 
In order to answer this question, it is worthwhile to examine a single issue pertinent to both 
reform and fundamentalist thinking on this continuum. One such example, though many 
could be given, is Islamic banking. 
 
The world of banking has witnessed an exponential growth in Islamic banking in recent 
years. The seeds of contemporary Islamic banking itself were sown as long ago as 1952, by 
the government of Saudi Arabia, with the establishment of the Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency, which had regulatory oversight over the banking sector and carried currency 
issuance capability without the use of interest.  This was followed by the ‘real’ emergence of 
Islamic banking in Egypt in 1963.
44
 The sector has continued to grow since, with growth in 
just the past decade, exceeding the half-century prior to it. Even conventional banks in parts 
of the Muslim world have converted to Islamic banking because of demand - examples 
include Emirates Bank, now Emirates Islamic Bank; Sharjah Bank, now Sharjah Islamic 
Bank. Even in the United Kingdom, where Islamic banking products were already available 
through Islamic-arms within conventional banks, such as HSBC and Lloyds TSB, the latest 
addition is a Sharia compliant bank in its entirety, called The Islamic Bank of Britain, 
renamed Al Rayan Bank in 2015. 
 
In terms of free market economics, this emergence must be fuelled by demand. The demand 
for Islamic banking as opposed to conventional banking which was already widely available 
indicates that fundamentalist thought, in the paradigm of the wider view articulated, is at the 
root of the demand. Ergo, fundamentalism must, by definition, be on the rise to generate this 
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demand. In turn, the emergence of Islamic banking into the mainstream has caused 
moderates, or Secular Muslims and Populist Muslims on the continuum, to reconsider their 
banking options, once an Islamic alternative became available. Consequently, the act of 
moving money from conventional to Islamic banking plays a small, but significant part in 
moving the individual further to the right on the fundamentalist continuum. Add to this a 
range of other issues, for example, other financial products, such as Islamic insurance, 
regulation and wider distribution of Halal food products, state funded Islamic schools and so 
on, the picture becomes clearer. Ever-increasing availability of Islamic products and services, 
results in greater participation of them by Muslims, which in turn results in more demand, 
and so the cycle continues. Thus, it is clear that reform and the fundamentalist continuum are 
interrelated. What is not proven or normatively expected is that the greater practice of Islam 
on the left and centre of the continuum can, or ever will, result in rejectionism, fanaticism or 
violent extremism, as opposed to Muslims settling for a more desirable middle course. 
Conclusion 
In examining and defining Islamic fundamentalism, it can be argued that Islamic 
fundamentalism exists; that it is negatively stereotyped but is only a negative force when 
examined through a misinformed lens; that it is inclusive of a broad spectrum of Muslims and 
their diverse range of views; that it is interrelated with reform and revivalism in the Muslim 
world; and that the contemporary paradigm of Islamic fundamentalism needs to be re-
examined. 
 
This paper has therefore argued that Islamic fundamentalism is a relevant, though deviated 
term, which is inclusive of perhaps all Muslims across a continuum of ideas and practice. The 
outcome, however, is not that the term exists or its relevance, but rather to extend the 
discourse as to whether or not there is compatibility and potential for harmony between the 
Islamic fundamentalism continuum and the broader global community, in particular the West, 
and if so, can issues, such as “rationalism, humanism, secularisation, democracy and 
globalisation”45 be reconciled, above all between the West and political Islamic 
fundamentalists. This reconciliation requires deep insight as essentially the divisions are 
based on two opposing paradigms; those of understanding the world through divine 
sovereignty or a world defined by human supremacy and understanding.
46
 With such an 
extreme dichotomy of paradigms, peace, harmony and mutual co-existence, which are 
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admirable aspirations but evidently hard to achieve, should remain at the forefront, in spite of 
the fact that the reality seems to be moving away from these noble goals. 
 
It is clear from the study that the events of September 11 2001 in the United States, followed 
by the events of July 7 2005 in London to a lesser degree, have acted as catalysts in terms of 
the continuum of Islamic fundamentalism. The consequential shake-up of Muslim perception, 
both from an internal perspective amongst Muslims themselves and an external perspective 
from observers of Muslim attitudes, behaviours and beliefs, has led to a dynamic tension 
between, on the one hand, a movement for democratising and liberalising Muslim society in 
line with Western values, and on the other, a fanatic antagonism to Western values, with a 
third, middle way, a vision of reviving a unified Islamic perspective based on traditional 
values inclusive of all Muslims and existing in harmony with and within the West. 
 
The resultant effect has thus been efforts on these various pressures to promote their agendas 
through the means available to them. These means, range from the use of force and violence 
at one end of the continuum, to secular interpretations of Islam at the other, with a view to 
entering the hearts and minds of Muslims in an effort to move them along the continuum in 
the desired direction, from the viewpoint of the instigator for change. 
 
This work has thus explored the phenomena, through developing a model for the 
fundamentalism continuum and evaluating it from various perspectives. Muslims throughout 
the world, whether in majority Muslim countries, or minorities, are facing pressures to act 
and respond with ever greater fluidity on the continuum on individual, social and national 
levels, compared to earlier times. 
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Figure 1. The Islamic continuum of fundamentalism (adapted from Dekmejian, 1995:175). 
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APOLITICAL POLITICAL 
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Position on 
Continuum 
Secular Muslims Populist Islamists 
Social/Spiritual 
Revivalists 
Political Gradualists Political Activists Revolutionary Jihadists 
Expression 
of political 
views 
Secular Muslims, often nationalists and 
often espouse counter-terrorism, anti-
radicalisation missions, Western 
democratic values or political affiliations 
e.g Inspire and Quilliam Foundation (UK) 
Individual revivalists 
Collective revivalists with largely apolitical 
structures. Participation in politics is 
absent, as it is perceived as allying with 
non-Muslims or submission to a non-
Islamic, secular system47 
Expression of Islamic politics through 
knowledge-based revivalism 
Expression of Islamic politics through 
demonstration, protest and ‘city centre 
dawah’ 
Religious fanaticism, rejectionist 
philosophy, violent 
Individual 
level of 
religious 
observance 
Limited or non-practicing 
(inward) - e.g. Men do not frequent local 
mosques, exception may be Friday and/or 
Eid prayers, women unlikely to wear Hijab 
and oppose Niqab 
Building personal character and morality 
through individual practice 
(inward) 
Religious observance and practice based on 
scholarly interpretation of foundational 
texts and historic scholarly tradition 
Most common methodology is developing 
personal practice and propagating this 
practice among Muslims to the left of the 
continuum 
(inward/outward) 
Practicing 
Organised study groups/’circles’ 
(inward/outward) 
Practicing 
Propagation of desire for Islamic caliphate 
Methods seen as offensive and hostile 
(outward) 
Practicing 
Methods seen as aggressive and irrational 
Propagation of political philosophy is 
clandestine 
(outward) 
Broader 
affiliations 
Identify with broader social or cultural 
groups 
Develops own sense of Islamic 
understanding, which may be evidentially 
baseless or opinionated 
Absence of affiliations 
Develops own sense of Islamic 
understanding based on reading and reason 
Organised Muslim groups 
Focus on collective worship and 
propagation 
Strong South Asian, North African 
influences 
Organised conferences 
Identifiable contemporary scholars 
Strong Saudi Arabian/Yemeni/Egyptian 
influence 
Rallies, demos and public gatherings 
Media target 
Strong Middle Eastern influence 
Methods involve covert tactics and long 
term terrorism strategy 
Goals 
Integration with surrounding socio-political 
environment 
Advocate separation of “church” and state 
Mutual co-existence and engagement with 
surrounding socio-cultural environment 
Reformation of Muslims based on spiritual 
revivalism, covert and separatist existence 
within surrounding socio-cultural 
environment 
Reformation of Muslims based on 
intellectual revivalism 
Caliphate on the basis of nation state 
Caliphate on the basis of Ummah (global 
Islamic state) 
Example 
associations 
Individual ethos outside an Islamic 
framework 
Will not draw from other Islamic groups 
and organisations 
Individual ethos within an Islamic 
framework 
May draw from many other Islamic groups 
and organisations 
Males frequent local mosques, females don 
the Hijab (not Niqab), Islamic conference 
attendance, domestic libraries, faith-based 
or home schooling are all popular 
Focus on promotion of own ‘brand’ of 
Islamic thought, often through cultural or 
sectarian partiality with strong ties to a 
branch of Sunni Madhhab.48 Organisations 
well-represented in this field include 
Tabligh Al-Jama’at (India), Barelwi 
(Pakistan) or similar 
Ijtihȃd-based thinkers such as Salafi- 
movements, e.g. Jamaa’t Ihya Minhaaj al-
Sunna (JIMAS, UK), Ikhwaan Muslimeen 
(Muslim Brotherhood), or similar, in 
contrast to Taqlȋd emphasis of 
Social/Spiritual Revivalists49 
Organisations working for the 
establishment of a caliphate in Western 
countries, especially the UK, e.g Hizb ul-
Tahrir, Khilafah, UK4Islam 
‘al-Qaeda’, Islamic State 
(IS/ISIS/ISIL/Da’ish), Boko Haram 
Internet 
usage for 
religious 
purposes 
No use for religious purposes, perhaps very 
occasional use of fatwa banks, organising a 
Hajj trip or finding a mosque for Eid prayer 
Tool for acquiring knowledge about Islam 
Use of fatwa banks 
Simplistic forms of networking 
Information about organised events 
Simple forms of dissemination of ideas, not 
explicitly funded 
Television is taboo for many, but Internet 
forums, blogs and networking sites are in 
common use and creation of simple online  
fatwa banks based on selected, approved 
scholars 
Permanently resourced and well-funded 
fatwa banks, websites, blogs etc 
Online universities and other educational 
resources, such as Arabic language 
learning, Imam training programmes 
Organisation of events, rallies 
Dissemination of ideas, literature and other 
media, often to counteract popular media 
and rebut criticism 
Recruitment through chat rooms and social 
media 
Indoctrination and recruitment 
Broadcasting of terrorism information 
Communication of extreme media, 
including weapons manufacturing 
literature, training videos. On-line 
grooming of Muslim girls as Jihadi brides 
increasing 
Table 1. Analysing the continuum. 
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